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FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND UNION POLITICAL
EXPENDITURES-McNAMARA V. JOHNSTON
Traditionally, union members who objected to political contributions
made by their labor union could seek either civil' or criminal' remedies
1. For examples of private remedies which have been litigated in the past, see Brother-
hood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), and International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (enforcement of union shop agreement violates
members' First and Fifth Amendment rights where dues paid as a condition of employ-
ment are used for political contributions); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408
(10th Cir. 1971) (political contributions under agency shop agreement may be breach of
duty of fair representation); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1970) (breach of duty of fair representation possible where agency shop agreement implies
money will be used for collective bargaining and not for political contributions).
2. 18 U.S.C. §610 (1970). The Corrupt Practices Act provides:
It is unlawful for any national bank or any corporation organized by authority
of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office,
or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribu-
tion or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and
Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates
for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or
other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this sec-
tion. ...
For purposes of this section "labor organization" means any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
The following provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub., L. No. 92-
225, tit. I, §205, 86 Stat. 10, was subsequently added:
As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or expenditure" shall include
any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money, or any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a
national or state bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election
to any of the offices referred to in this section; but shall not include communica-
tions by a corporation to its stockholders and their families or by a labor organi-
zation to its members and their families on any subject; nonpartisan registration
and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and
their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their fami-
lies; the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a
separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation
or labor organization: Provided, That it shall be unlawful for such a fund to
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at law. Generally, however, judicial decisions3 and amendments limited
the effectiveness of the criminal remedy. As a result, union members
increasingly began to resort to private remedies.
In McNamara v. Johnston5 members of Local 558 of the United Auto
Workers (UAW) unsuccessfully sought a private remedy under section
501 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).,
make a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value
secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat
of force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees or other monies
required as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition
of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial transaction.
3. In order to avoid the freedom of speech and association problems of the unamended
Corrupt Practices Act, the courts interpreted the act narrowly. See, e.g., United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (union endorsement of political candidate published at the
expense of union is not a prohibited expenditure); United States v. Construction & Gen-
eral Laborers Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (use of union funds to pay
campaign workers and repair campaign trailer not prohibited); United States v. Painters
Local 481, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948) (political advertisements paid for by union
are outside scope of Corrupt Practices Act). But see United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
129 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's narrow interpretation of the
Corrupt Practices Act). See generally Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610:
Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 936 (1973).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. II, §205, 86 Stat.
10, amending 18 U.S.C. §610 (1970).
5. 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1506 (1976).
6. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970) provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organi-
zation occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members
as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account
the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money
and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to
manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and
bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to re-
frain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an
adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or
acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests
of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received
by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him
or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory
provision in the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization or a general
exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person
of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void as
against public policy.
29 U.S.C. §501(b) (1970) provides in part:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organiza-
tion is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) and the
labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover
damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable
1976]
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The plaintiffs, under a union shop agreement, were required to pay dues
through their local to the UAW Community Action Program (CAP).7 In
May 1969, by a majority vote, Local 558 passed a resolution denying
UAW and CAP officials the right to use their dues to support certain
political causes." The officials received notice of the resolution but con-
tinued to make the contributions.
Plaintiffs brought suit in federal court alleging that union officials
breached their fiduciary duty under section 501(a) of the LMRDA1 by
failing to hold union funds for the benefit of the organization, continuing
to make expenditures in violation of the Local's resolution, and making
political contributions in violation of section 610 of the Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.'0 Further, the plaintiffs maintained that the authorizations of
political expenditures in the union constitution were void as against
public policy because they authorized violations of the Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.
The court held that there is no remedy under section 501 for breach
time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization,
such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any
district court of the United States or in any state court of competent jurisdiction
to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the
benefit of the labor organization ...
7. CAP is an organization established by the UAW twenty-first consitutional
convention to "engage in community, civic, welfare, educational, environmen-
tal, cultural, citizenship-legislative, consumer protection, community services
and other activities designed to improve the economic and social conditions of
UAW members and their families and to promote the general welfare and demo-
cratic way of life for all people.
Letter from International President, Walter Reuther, to all local unions on May 19, 1969,
cited in McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975).
8. Resolution-the membership of UAW Local 558, party to a union shop, deny
use of all or part of their dues money in support of any political candidate,
political organization, state or federal legislation, any organization or group
engaged in violence, the illegal seizure or destruction of property, engaged in
social disorder, promoting racial agitation, and any organization or group that
preaches, promotes or identifies with Marxist or communist ideology. Further-
more, this membership does not authorize any person, organization or group to
act as spokesman for UAW Local 558 on any political endorsement, legislative
endorsement, social problem or movement of any kind unless or until the mem-
bership has clearly made such an endorsement by voting 68% in support by
secret ballot using the dues check-off lists to verify voter's eligibility.
Some of the organizations which received political contributions from the UAW were:
National Students Association, Students for a Democratic Society, Students Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee, New Mobilization for Peace and Turn Toward Peace. McNa-
mara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975).
9. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
10. 18 U.S.C. §610 (1970).
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of fiduciary duty where the political expenditure of union funds is au-
thorized by the union's constitution." Furthermore, the public policy of
section 501(a) does not prohibit authorized'" political contributions.'"
Therefore, the court held that it could not consider the issue of injunc-
tive relief under section 501 of the LMRDA for future violations of the
Corrupt Practices Act section 610.11 The court went on to say that it
lacks jurisdiction in cases alleging section 610 violations. Primary juris-
diction rests with the Federal Election Commission. 5
This Note will analyze the court's interpretation of section 501 in
McNamara. It also will discuss possible alternative remedies available
11. The UAW's constitutional authorization prevails over the Local's resolution.
12. Had the political expenditures been unauthorized, there would have been a breach
of the fiduciary duty to "manage, invest, and expend the (union funds) in accordance with
(the union's) constitution, bylaws and . . . resolutions .. " 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
13. Citing the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §359A, §19, Comment a, §24, Com-
ment g, §411, Comment e, and §412(2) (1957), the court also held that defendant union
officials as agents cannot be held liable to the principal for unlawful conduct as long as
the principal authorized that conduct. 522 F.2d at 1165-66. But in the case of labor
unions, there are other circumstances to consider. The agent-union officials are in a better
position to know the legality of their conduct than are the rank and file members. They
also may be in such a powerful position that they can control the voting on union bylaws
and constitutional amendments. If the court's holding is followed, it would be possible
for union leaders to have their bylaws passed and be totally insulated from civil liability
to the union rank and file if the leaders' acts turn out to be unlawful.
14. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), held that the Federal Election Commission has
primary jurisdiction in section 610 suits. McNamara went further than Cort on the issue
of jurisdiction. McNamara held that primary jurisdiction extends to suits for injunctions
alleging violations of section 610 which are brought under other statutes, such as section
501 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §501 (1970).
15. While McNamara was pending, the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments were enacted into law. The Federal Election Commission was established, 2 U.S.C.
§437c(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) and was given "primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil
enforcement," 2 U.S.C. §437c(b) (Supp. V 1975), of the Corrupt Practices Act. Therefore,
the federal court could no longer deal with civil suits alleging violations of section 610.
The only way a union member could enjoin political expenditures which violated the
Corrupt Practices Act would be to follow the administrative procedure of the Federal
Election Commission.
However, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), decided just a few months after
McNamara, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Election Commission could not
validly exercise the powers granted to it. These powers, granted under 2 U.S.C. §437c(b)
(Supp. V 1975), could only be exercised by "Officers of the United States" appointed in
accordance with article U, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.
Although the Buckley decision found the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act unconsti-
tutional and took jurisdiction away from the Federal Election Commission, the law was
amended this year, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (May 11, 1976), giving the Federal
Election Commission primary jurisdiction once again. Thus, civil suits alleging violations
of section 610 may not be brought in federal court.
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for protecting the rights of individual union members who disagree with
the political causes supported by their union.
SECTION 501(a) LMRDA AS A PRIVATE REMEDY
The McNamara decision precluded a section 501 remedy on the
grounds that the campaign expenditures were authorized" by the
union's constitution. Such authorization could only be attacked if void
as against public policy. 7 The court stated that the legislative history
of section 501(a) must be examined to determine "public policy." Ex-
amining the legislative history of section 501(a), the court quoted Sena-
tor Morse from the Senate debates: "I have been assured that the fidu-
ciary section will not prevent political contributions. I trust the courts
will so interpret the language in the bill."'" Thus, the court concluded
"Congress did not intend section 501 to hamper authorized union finan-
cial contributions to community and political organizations."" This
analysis barely scratched the surface of the legislative intent. A better
interpretation would be that Congress did not want section 501(a) to be
construed as a prohibition of all political expenditures. Legal political
contributions were not intended to be prohibited under this section.
However, Congress certainly could not have intended to exclude illegal
political contributions from the coverage of section 501(a).
The McNamara approach to defining public policy solely through the
legislative history of section 501 was contrary to an earlier Pennsylvania
district court case, Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen.2 ° That
case was decided one year after the LMRDA went into effect and was
the first case to interpret section 501(a). There, the court looked to the
general purposes section of the LMRDA2 ' in determining the relevant
16. The court distinguished Anderson v. Vestal, 79 L.R.R.M. 2755 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
which held that there could be a section 501 remedy for unauthorized political expendi-
tures in violation of the Corrupt Practices Act, section 610.
17. The court summarily denied the plaintiffs' contention that the constitutional provi-
sions were exculpatory clauses rather than authorizations. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970) pro-
vides that "a general exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor
organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void
as against public policy."
18. Id. at 1165, quoting 105 CONG. RE c. 17872 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse). See
also 105 CONG. REc. 6526 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
19. 522 F.2d at 1165.
20. 182 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961).
21. The court indicated that its purview was not limited to the LMRDA. 182 F. Supp.
at 617.
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public policy. It reasoned that since section 501 defined fiduciary duties
in the "broadest terms possible," Congress was giving the courts free
rein to develop new case law."2 Therefore, the court in Highway Truck
Drivers stated that it could extend its interpretation of the relevant
"public policy" of section 501 to include the overall policy of the
LMRDA.23
Had McNamara looked to the "public policy" of the general purposes
provision of the LMRDA rather than congressional intent behind only
one section, the result would have been very different. One of the na-
tional labor policies expressed in the general purposes provision of the
LMRDA is the elimination of corruption.24 That policy is not furthered
when union officials are permitted to make campaign contributions in
violation of section 610. Such expenditures are not "for the benefit of
the organization" under section 501(a). 5 The general purposes section
of the LMRDA also provides for the protection of the rights of individual
union members." One of these rights would be the right to disagree with
union political expenditures where the expenditure is alleged to be not
"for the benefit of the organization."27 The advantage of using this ap-
proach is that even in the absence of a section 610 violation, individual
union members would have a civil remedy under section 501.
ANALYSIS
The McNamara decision narrows the scope of section 501.1Y It pre-
cludes the use of section 501 as a private remedy for individual union
members who disagree with political causes supported by the union and
who want to avoid union liability for violations of the Corrupt Practices
Act. However, had the court given section 501 a broad interpretation,
other substantial difficulties would have resulted.
22. 182 F. Supp. at 617. The court used by analogy Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1964),
authorized courts to fashion a new body of substantive federal law derived from policy of
national labor laws and state law).
23. In Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D. Pa.
1960), the court stated in dicta that consideration of public policy extended to the policy
of national labor laws. This implies that the court could have gone beyond the policy of
the LMRDA.
24. 29 U.S.C. §401(b) (1970).
25. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
26. 29 U.S.C. §401(b) (1970). The LMRDA also contains a "Bill of Rights" for union
members. 29 U.S.C. §411-15 (1970).
27. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
28. For other cases which interpret section 501 narrowly, see Yanity v. Benware, 367
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1967); Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964). But see Johnson v.
Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963); and Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.
1972) (§501 broadly construed).
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Extending the scope of section 501(a) could "open the floodgates" to
litigation of internal union disputes. Union members could challenge
any expenditure not directly related to collective bargaining and organ-
izing as not "solely for the benefit of the organization and its mem-
bers."2 9 This leaves a wide range of cultural, educational, political and
charitable activities that unions typically engage in as potential subjects
of litigation. In addition, a wider range of litigable disputes might result
in the abuse of courts as a forum for power plays by union factions.
Another consideration is that if section 501(a) is broadened to protect
individual union members," the whole concept of the union as a
collectivity would be undermined. There is constant tension between
individual and union interests. Unionism is based on the precept that
individuals will subordinate their separate interests to the interests of
the group and ultimately benefit from whatever the union achieves.
Members are expected to abide by majority decisions so that the union
has the support it needs to bargain with employers. Whenever individ-
ual members challenge the majority, as they would under a broad sec-
tion 501, the ability of the union to function is impaired.
Two section 501(a) standards, that expenditures be made "for the
benefit of the organization" and "in accordance with its constitution
and bylaws"3' may be the focal point for individual-union conflicts.
Broad constitutional authorizations of political expenditures would
allow union officials to make specific expenditures to candidates or or-
ganizations which some union members believe are not for the benefit
of the organization. There is an argument that where this type of section
501 conflict exists, the wishes of the rank and file should prevail. How-
ever, this policy would be burdensome and unduly interfere with the
ability of union officials to make day-to-day executive decisions. In
addition, Senator Kennedy's statement that "Union officers would not
be guilty of breach of trust under this section when their expenditures
are [authorized]" indicates that general constitutional authorizations
will prevail.
The final impact of a broadened section 501 would be to encourage
forum-shopping. By complaining of violations of the fiduciary duty
while avoiding any reference to section 610, it would be possible to
circumvent the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Election Commis-
sion." Thus the plaintiff could open the door to a trial de novo in federal
court.
29. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
30. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
31. 29 U.S.C. §501(a) (1970).
32. See notes 14-15 supra.
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McNamara v. Johnston effectively would eliminate a section 501(a)
private remedy for union members who disagree with the authorized
political expenditures of the union. If this decision is followed, union
members will be left with two alternatives:33 rebate procedures within
the union and a private action for damages under section 610.
Rebate procedures were instituted by labor unions to satisfy the stan-
dards developed by case law and amendments to section 610.11 In
McNamara, the court deemed it significant that the UAW had a rebate
procedure. They stated that the rebate procedure was an adequate rem-
edy for protection of union dissidents' interests. 5 However, there are
major problems with the rebate systems which render them inadequate
for protecting the rights of union dissenters. Individuals who do not
agree with the way their money is spent may not take the time and
trouble to request a rebate. The individual union member may be
burdened unduly in keeping himself informed of the union's political
activities and in giving notice of his dissent in the proper instance. In
addition, there may be an underlying resistance to "making waves." As
one commentator stated, "Something more than a patriotic desire to
help selected political candidates must have been responsible for so
many laborers choosing to donate up to two dollars per work day to a
fund whose use lay in the sole discretion of others. . . ."I' A rebate
procedure requires the dissenter to notify his superiors of his dissent.
This alone is enough to dissuade the individual union member from
protesting. However, when coupled with the broad role of the union in
the lives of its members, the union member is not likely to voice opposi-
33. Union members may also complain to the Federal Election Commission of possible
criminal violations of section 610. However, section 610 has been ineffective in the past.
See note 3 supra. Also, a criminal suit will not help the union members who want returned
that portion of their dues used for the political contribution.
34. The rebate systems were designed to comply with the requirement that money used
for political contributions be obtained voluntarily. See, e.g., United States v. UAW, 352
U.S. 567 (1957); Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). See also
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I, §205, 86 Stat. 10, which
added the last paragraph to section 610, incorporating the standards previously used in
the case law to interpret section 610. See note 2 supra. But see United States v. Lewis
Food Co., 336 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966) (despite voluntary consent by corporate sharehold-
ers, political contributions violated section 610).
Courts have suggested that as long as there is a rebate procedure, the voluntariness
requirement is satisfied. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); McNamara v. Johnston,
522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. 522 F.2d at 1166-67.
36. See Comment, supra note 3.
37. Id. at 968.
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tion to political expenditures on an individual basis."
Even if union dissenters can get a rebate, they are still identified in
political terms with the union and the causes which they as individuals
oppose. Whether any individual union member contributes money to a
political fund or not is immaterial; that member will always be asso-
ciated with the union as a class. Thus, as long as labor unions are
involved in the political process, dissidents will have their views subor-
dinated to those of the majority and section 610 will not protect them.
In a situation such as the one in McNamara, if the contribution does in
fact violate section 610, the union could be criminally liable and each
union member, including the dissenters, would have to bear the burden
of litigation and of any fine imposed on the union. Even if the dissenters
receive rebates, they still have to pay for the contributions indirectly
through the extra litigation expenses incurred by the union and passed
on to the members.
The second alternative for individuals who disagree with union politi-
cal expenditures is a civil action for damages under section 610. Cort v.
Ash39 involved a shareholders' derivative suit against a corporation. In
that case, the Supreme Court held that the Corrupt Practices Act,
which is a criminal statute, does not necessarily imply a private remedy
of damages 5 However, in a footnote to the decision, the Supreme Court
suggested that in the case of a union, other considerations might war-
rant a different result:
Congress did show concern, in permanently expanding section 610 to
unions, for protecting union members from use of their funds for politi-
cal purposes. This difference in emphasis may reflect a recognition
that, while a stockholder acquires his stock voluntarily and is free to
dispose of it, union membership and the payment of union dues is often
involuntary because of union security and check-off provisions. It is
therefore arguable that the federal interest in the relationship between
members and their unions is much greater than the parallel interest in
the relationship between stockholders and state-created corporations."
McNamara was the first case after Cort involving the same criminal
statute and a private suit for damages in the union context. The court
mentioned the section 610 private action for damages problem,"2 but
38. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
39. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
40. There is precedent for the implication of civil remedies into criminal statutes. See,
e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); JI. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
41. 422 U.S. at 81 n.13.
42. 522 F.2d at 1162, 1164-65.
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since it was not directly at issue the question was never resolved. In fact,
the plaintiff-appellants carefully avoided arguing a private remedy of
damages under the Corrupt Practices Act, 3 fearing another Cort deci-
sion. Instead, they chose to argue a cause of action for damages under
section 501 LMRDA for breach of the fiduciary duty by violating section
610. Thus, the question of whether there is a private action for damages
under section 610 in the union context is left unresolved.
In Cort, four factors are listed as being relevant to the determination
of whether a civil action for damages may be brought under a criminal
statute such as the Corrupt Practices Act:
1. Do the plaintiffs belong to a class for whose benefit the statute was
passed?
2. Is there legislative intent to create a private remedy?
3. Would it be consistent with the legislative purpose of the act?
4. Is it an area that is traditionally a question of state law where a
federal cause of action would be inappropriate?"
The presence of any or all of these factors may be sufficient to find a
civil cause of action."
In the case of labor unions, the plaintiff union members may in fact
belong to a class for whose benefit the statute was passed." "The perma-
nent expansion of section 610 to include labor unions are part of
comprehensive labor legislation, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947."' 7 Part of
the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA), as stated in secticifil, is "to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor
organizations."4 The LMRA was to be the bill of rights for the worker,'4
therefore section 610 meets the first requirement.
While there is no indication in the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act that Congress intended to create a private remedy of dam-
ages when the coverage of the Corrupt Practices Act was extended to
include labor unions, there is also no indication that Congress specifi-
cally rejected it. A private remedy would be consistent with the legisla-
43. Id. at 1165 n.8.
44. 422 U.S. at 78.
45. See id. at 80.
46. Id. at 81 n.13.
47. Id.
48. 29 U.S.C. §141(b) (1970).
49. The purpose of the LMRA was "... to protect the rights of individual workers in
their relations with labor organizations .... The bill was written as a bill of rights for
the laboring man; to protect him from ... encroachments on his individual rights .. "
93 CONG. REc. 3412 (1947) (remarks of Congressman Allen); See also 93 CONG. REC. 3513
(1947) (remarks of Congressman Kennedy); 93 CONG. Rac. 3519 (1947) (remarks of
Congressman Kersten).
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tive purpose of the Corrupt Practices Act, section 610. One way of pro-
tecting the rights of union members'" is to allow a civil action for
damages when those rights are violated. In McNamara those rights were
violated by using union dues for political contributions. It would be
appropriate for the individual union members to vindicate their rights
by getting back the amount of the contributions in the form of civil
damages. Thus, the third factor favors a private remedy for violations
of section 610. The last factor falls squarely in favor of a federal cause
of action. Labor law5 and control of federal elections are more appropri-
ately federal causes of action than questions of state law.
For these reasons, a private action for damages for violating section
610 could be implied in the union context given the proper case.
McNamara could have been the test case had the plaintiffs chosen to
use the section 610 private remedy theory. However, due to the judicial
practice in the past of interpreting section 610 narrowly, the success of
a section 610 private remedy of damages is highly doubtful. 2 In addi-
tion, a civil remedy under section 610 assumes a violation of the statute.
It would not help those who disagree with the union's legal political
contributions.
With the foreclosure of section 501 as a remedy after McNamara, the
right of individual union members to dissent from authorized union
political contributions is impaired. The alternatives left after
McNamara are unsatisfactory. Rebate procedures within the union are
burdensome to the members. They do not allow the members to stop
the union from making political expenditures which may be illegal. The
section 610 criminal remedy is only available to stop illegal contribu-
tions. It does not help the member who disagrees with a legal expendi-
ture or who wants a refund of union dues. The latter problem would be
alleviated if, in the future, the Federal Election Commission would hold
that there is a private remedy of damages for section 610 violations. For
the present, however, the individual union member's right to disagree
with union political expenditures will continue to be sacrificed to the
interests of the union.
Karen Berkowitz Brenner
50. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
51. Labor law is one of the areas where there is a federal common law. See Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
52. See cases discussed in note 3 supra. See also Comment, supra note 3.
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